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This study develops costs, effectiveness criteria, and
cost-effectiveness ratios for military herbicide systems and
three other alternatives which can perform the missions of
foliage removal and crop destruction in support of counter-
insurgency operations. The results reflect the Vietnam
combat environment where all systems were employed at
sometime during the period 1965-1971. The systems considered
are aerial delivery of herbicides by UH-1 helicopters and
UC-123 Air Force aircraft, tactical land clearing with
crawler tractors, "slash and burn" clearing with indigenous
cutters, and firebomb ing with CH-47 helicopters. The effec-
tiveness criteria focus on the ability of these systems to
perform the two missions and withstand the rigorous
constraints of a hypothetical combat mission. From these
criteria, two sets of cost-effectiveness vectors are
obtained to allow a decision maker the opportunity to evalu-
ate each system and determine a possible force structure to
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The purpose of this study is to conduct a cost-
effectiveness evaluation of military herbicide systems in
a counterinsurgency environment. The test case for the
determination of relevant costs will be those dollar costs
incurred during the systems' employment in vegetation
removal and crop destruction missions in support of combat
operations in the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) during 1965-1971.
Since costs are the values of alternatives foregone, the
study will address three other techniques used for foliage
clearance and crop control in RVN during the same time-
frame. The alternatives to herbicide operations which will
be considered are:
1. Tactical land clearing operations.




Each method will be discussed in detail in Chapter II.
Specifically excluded from the scope of the study is
consideration of the externalities that might result from
possible damage to the ecological balance of the host
country.
The cost measures will attempt to show the relative
dollar expenditures among the systems involved. Several

measures of effectiveness will be used to judge their output
and ability to accomplish the missions of foliage removal
and crop destruction under combat conditions. These,
coupled with the cost measures, will yield cost-effectiveness
figures which will be the basis for comparisons. These
comparisons will present the decision maker with sets of
data on the strengths and weaknesses of the individual
alternatives and combinations of the systems.
B. BACKGROUND
The proper use of cover and concealment has always been
a critical factor in planning military operations. History
is full of examples of armies that effectively used natural
cover and foliage. Often, judicious use of these elements
made up for other deficiencies in the forces. The colonial
settlers of early America learned the arts of cover and
concealment from the Indians and later put them to good use
in the War of Independence. As warfare evolved from the
straight-line formations of the 19th century and the
trenches of World War I, it became apparent that strict
adherence to the principles of concealment was not reserved
solely for the guerrilla or irregular soldier. Hence,
tactics and methods were developed in an attempt to deny
any potential enemy, insurgent or conventionally organized,
the protection and sustenance that might be offered by the
vegetation.

The term "herbicide" was coined in the 1930 's to
encompass that family of chemicals which are antiplant
agents. Some members of this family were found to be
systemic hormones which entered broad-leaf plants touching
off wild growth and eventually killing them. Others were
determined to be dessicants which injured the foliage by
direct chemical action on contact. Throughout World War II,
military research in chemical warfare played an important
role in the development of the potent herbicides now in
world-wide use. Although initial efforts were directed at
the discovery of suitable dessicants (for use as anticrop
agents) , scientists from the University of Chicago deter-
mined that some of these growth regulators might be applied
to grasses and tropical plants. This generated a great deal
of interest in the defoliation or foliage removal properties
of the chemicals since many tons of explosives had been
expended on Pacific islands to deny the Japanese concealment
afforded by the tropical rain forests. In early 1945,
successful tests were conducted in the Florida Everglades
concerning the possibility of using several inorganic
defoliants in aerosol form. The results from this work
prompted the Army to recommend the use of ammonium thiocy-
nate in the Pacific theater. This recommendation was not
adopted for fear of the repercussions that might arise from
the agent's association with chemicals of the cyanide




In the late forties, the research generated during World
War II was readily employed by civilian industry. The
previous discovery of the organic chemicals 2,4-D and 2,4, 5-T
fostered revolutionary steps in chemical plant control and
stimulated the development of a host of new agents. These
herbicides were more effective, more selective, and less
hazardous than the former compounds. Chemicals such as
picloram, bromacil, cacodylic acid, and paraquat were
tailored to perform specific kinds of vegetation control.
Consequently, their use at home and abroad became wide-
spread. In 1950 the estimated market for herbicides came
to $1.5 million while by 1965, it had grown to over $211
million. (This was prior to extensive military purchase of
certain agents for use in RVN.) In 1959 alone, American
farmers treated 53 million acres of acres of agricultural
land not to mention the thousands of miles sprayed by local
government agencies and private corporations to control
growth along highways, powerline right-of-ways, fire breaks,
and ditches. [House and others, 1967.1
The Department of Defense (DOD) did not become involved
in herbicide operations until 1958. The success of British
defoliation operations with helicopters in Malaya prompted
several feasibility studies on acceptable defoliants and
delivery techniques. In 1961, on request of President Diem
and the government of RVN, a test program was established to
assist in countering that nation's growing Communist-inspired
insurgency. The Vietnamese army (ARVN) found that the most

difficult and frustrating task was locating the enemy. The
dense forests and jungles offered the Viet Cong (VC) excel-
lent concealment which permitted them to move with relative
impunity to within striking distance of key military install-
ations, lines of communications (LOC) , and government
centers. By removing parts of the foliage, the Allied
forces hoped to increase aerial and ground surveillance capa-
bilities and deny the use of certain areas as sanctuaries.
The actual herbicide operations began under the codename
RANCH HAND in January 1962 with three specially configured
U.S. Air Force (USAF) UC-123B aircraft. The operations
proceeded for the next two years at a moderate scale but
with increased enemy resistance. Ground fire became so
intense that in March of 1965 fighter escorts were provided
on a permanent basis. The demand for defoliation and
controlled crop destruction missions increased as U.S.
participation in the war grew. This resulted in the RANCH
HAND program being expanded in 1966 into a squadron-size
unit, 12th Air Commando Squadron (later the 12th Special
Operations Squadron) , with an equipment level of 18 aircraft
and headquarters at Bien Hoa Air Base. In the peak years of
defoliation operations (1967-1968) , the squadron was
increased to 24 aircraft. JMcConnell, 1970. To supple-
ment the 12th Special Operations Squadron, some U.S. divi-
sion commanders were given the authority to conduct local
defoliation and crop destruction missions in their area of
operations (AO) with U.S. Army helicopters. These operations
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were usually complementary to the RANCH HAND sorties and
employed local aviation assets that were diverted from other
lift tasks.
From the inception of the test program, great effort was
made to insure proper targets were picked and spraying of
friendly areas was prevented. Each mission was approved by
the local Vietnamese province chief, the Military Assistance
Command Vietnam (MACV) , and the U.S. Embassy. Crop destruc-
tion targets were subject to special scrutiny so that the
most harm would be done to the VC and the least to the local
inhabitants. A commission was established to compensate and
reimburse those people who had suffered financial loss as a
result of herbicides. Although friendly areas were never
specifically targeted, some spray did occasionally drift
causing damage to rice crops or rubber trees. U.S. authori-
ties attempted to take prompt action on any claims whenever
this situation occurred. [Gonzales 1968
Concurrent with increased herbicide operations in
Vietnam, there was an expanding controversy over the program
in the United States. Critics asserted that if chemical
herbicides were commonly used, it might not be long before
more noxious chemical agents are considered usable. Others
have claimed that such an indiscriminate weapon results in
as much suffing for the local populace as the VC. Hersh
1968 and ILewallen 1971 I
. The scientific community
raised the question of the ecological consequences of
repeated herbicide applications. The American Association
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for the Advancement of Sciences (AAAS) has been and still is
the center of the controversy. Probably the most vocal and
widely quoted critic within AAAS is Dr. Matthew Meselson, a
Harvard University biologist. Dr. Meselson chaired the AAAS
Herbicide Assessment Commission and visited Vietnam on a
five-week tour. In the committee statement to an AAAS
convention, the following assertions were made:
1. The Army's crop destruction program was a
failure.
2. One-fifth to one-half of Vietnam's mangrove
forests had been "utterly destroyed."
3. One-half the trees in the mature hardwood
forests north and west of Saigon were
dead.
Several other scientists who had previously visited RVN in
1968-1969 strongly recommended and lobbied for the cancel-
lation of the herbicide operations until scientists had time
to study the long-term effects of the program. Orians and
Pfeiffer 1970
]
These recommendations coupled with severe criticism from
certain members of Congress and other citizens helped bring
about the suspension of herbicide operations in the summer
of 1970. On 7 October 1970, Public Law 91-441 directed the
Secretary of Defense to prepare a study to identify the role
-^Boffey, Phillip M. , "Herbicides in Vietnam: AAAS Study




of herbicides in support of combat operations and evaluate
their utility in RVN. It also required him to contract
with the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) for a comprehen-
sive study to determine the ecological and physiological
effects of the herbicide program in RVN. By 1 March 1972,
the Secretary of Defense was required to transmit the DOD
findings together with the NAS study to the President and
the Congress.
It is against this background of U.S. use of herbicides
and Congressional concern about the role of herbicides that
the examination of the alternatives discussed in the next




A. AERIAL DELIVERY OF HERBICIDES
Aerial delivery is the prime method of dissemination of
chemical herbicides for large-scale defoliation or crop
destruction missions. Other methods, such as use of the
three-gallon hand-pump sprayer, the M-106 riot control
dispenser, and boat-mounted spray systems, have been employed
in Vietnam but will not be considered in the context of this
study. However, all herbicide missions are designed to
accomplish some or all of the following objectives:
1. Deny the enemy cover and concealment and
channel his movement.
2. Deny the enemy the capability to forage
off the land.
3. Deny the enemy ambush sites adjacent to LOC.
4. Provide improved aerial and electronic
surveillance.
1. Delivery By Fixed Wing Aircraft (UC-123)
The major portion of the U.S. herbicide effort is
carried by a modified version of the Air Force's two-engine
medium cargo carrier, the C-123B "Provider." The aircraft
is given a spray capability ("UC" designation) by the
installation of the Hayes AA-45 system which consists of a
1,000 gallon internal tank, an operator console, and three
high pressure spray booms. Since most missions are carried
14

out at low altitudes and low speeds, the performance of the
aircraft is significantly upgraded by the addition of turbo-
jet engines. The intensity of enemy ground fire in Vietnam
has forced the Air Force to further protect the UC-123K with
additional armor plating for the crew and engines. The
UC-123K' s travel in fighter escorted flights ranging any-
where from two to seven aircraft, depending on the target
configuration. Each aircraft dispenses its 1,000 gallon
load in four minutes at less than 150 miles per hour and 150
feet off the ground. The Hayes system can be adjusted for
variable dissemination rates; however, these rates are
usually between one and one-half gallons to three gallons
per acre. [Major Pyatt]
Photo # 1: Four UC-123 aircraft of the 12th Air Commando




2. Delivery By Rotary Wing Aircraft (UH-1)
In certain areas, ground commanders are authorized
to conduct local herbicide operations. When UC-123 aircraft
are not available to do the job or the target is too small
to merit fixed wing sorties, the UH-1 helicopter (commonly
known as the "Huey" ) can be equipped with an internal tank
and spray booms. In initial operations in RVN, some U.S.
Army units used a field expedient which employed a 55-gallon
drum fitted with rubber hoses and sprayers mounted on the
helicopter skids. The second generation system used in the
UH-1 is the AGAVENCO sprayer, developed by a Las Vegas firm
for use in agricultural work. This system can be mounted in
the aircraft in less than one-half hour and consists of a
200 gallon tank, pump, and pressurized nozzles. Department
of the Army (DA) Training Circular (TC) 3-16 1969
J
. The
UH-1 fitted with the AGAVENCO provides the same dissemina-
tion rates as the UC-123 but its capacity is considerably
less. Although the system is designed for a 200 gallon
capacity, the combat requirements of two pilots, two door
gunners, and a system operator cut the UH-l's lift capability
to such an extent that the tank can only be loaded with 100
gallons. Iltc Rudrow I
The use of the helicopter in RVN for delivery of
herbicides has been far less standard than the operations of
the 12th Special Operations Squadron. Since division
commanders were the controlling authorities for these
missions in each AO, the methods used varied considerably
16

throughout the theater. Ideally, several "Hueys" should be
employed for efficiency's sake. However, since no helicop-
ters were set aside specifically for herbicide missions,
they were normally diverted on a one-by-one basis from other
combat sorties. The security escorts, the AH-lG ("Huey
Cobra"), faced the same problem, and while a defoliation
helicopter should be supported by two Cobras, on many occa-
sions, none were available. However, this lack of security
did not curtail the missions. IliTC Rudrow and LTC Sanches
Photo # 2: UH-1 helicopter taking -off on a defoliation




ORANGE, WHITE, and BLUE will be the agents considered
in this study. These chemicals do not constitute the
complete spectrum of herbicides, but they were the most
widely used in support of U.S. combat operations in RVN.




50% 2,4-D(n-butyl, 2-4 dicho- General defoliation:
lorophenoxyacetate) mangrove, jungle,
50% 2,4,5-T(n-butyl,2,4,5- and low-land scrub
trichorophenoxyacetate) trees.
20% Picloram (4-amino-3 , 5, 6- General defoliation:
trichloropicoline acid) Slower acting but
80% 2, 4-D(trisopropanolamine) more persistent than
ORANGE
BLUE












During defoliation operations in RVN, agents ORANGE
and WHITE were used interchangeably. It was found that these
agents did not permanently destroy all vegetation, although
the mangrove swamps still show heavy effects of the spraying.
Recent pictures taken of heavily defoliated areas show
considerable regrowth of foliage in hardwood forests and
along waterways. The NAS study will address this question
DA TC 3-16, Employment of Riot Control Agents, Flame,
Smoke, Antiplant Agents, and Personnel Detectors in Counter -
Guerrilla Operations, p. 80-81, April 1969.
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in detail along with other ecological effects of chemical
herbicides. [Tschirley 1969 I and Office of Deputy
Assistant Secretary of Defense (ODASD) 1971
J
..
4. Coverage and Limitations
The present sprayer systems used in both fixed and
rotary wing aircraft allow variable dissemination of herbi-
cides. These rates are as follows:
Table II-2: Herbicide Dissemination Rates
Mission Type Rate
Defoliation Three gallons/acre
Crop Destruction One and one-half to three
gallons/acre
[DA TC 3-16 1969]
The use of herbicides in support of combat operations
is limited in several respects. The best time to apply them
is during the particular plant's most active growing period.
While spraying during the dry season (which corresponds to
the non-active period of most plants) does produce defolia-
tion, the vegetation dies at a slower rate. In addition,
the proper atmospheric conditions must exist to insure
maximum coverage of the aerosol, assuming the aircraft is
flying at the proper speed and altitude. An inversion
temperature gradient and a wind of less than eight knots
insure not only proper coverage of the target but also mini-
mize the probability of drift onto friendly areas. This is
particularly important in an insurgency environment where
unintentional destruction of the indigenous population's
19

property and crops would be detrimental to the position of
the counter ins urgent forces.
B. TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
A tactical land clearing operation is designed to support
the ground tactical forces by denying the enemy any use or
benefit that might be gained from heavily vegetated terrain.
Unlike herbicide missions, a well-planned clearing operation
seeks to not only remove foliage but also the source of it
as well. This produces an advantage above those received by
defoliation since surveillance is improved in the horizontal
dimension as well as the vertical. This improvement is
realized by:
1. An increased ground-based anti-personnel
radar capability.
2. Increased visual observation.
3. Improved fields of fire.
4. Physical elimination of potential ambush
sites and base areas.
A secondary benefit derived from land clearing is the
possible economic enhancement of the area. Marketable
timber felled during the operation can be extracted for the
local lumbering industry, and if the tactical situation
permits, there is the potential for conversion of this
unused land for productive agricultural cultivation. DA
Pamphlet (Pam) 525-6 1970
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1. Equipment and Organization
Tactical land clearing revolves around the proper
use of a standard crawler tractor equipped with the Rome K/G
blade and kit assembly. This item of equipment, commonly
referred to as the "Rome Plow," was developed by Ernest
Kissner of Lottie, Louisiana for land reclamation of heavily
wooded tracts. The success of the blade prompted Mr. Kissner
to sell the rights to his equipment to the Rome Plow Company
of Cedartown, Georgia. Since 1957, it has been produced to
fit all standard sizes and makes of tractors (Caterpillar,
Allis-Chalmers, International Harvester). The tractor and
Rome blade became the method accepted for military land
clearing in 1966 after a test period at Fort Belvoir,
Virginia and Vietnam of practically all known commercial
clearing equipment. Rome Plow Company, Training Program
November 197 ll
.
The Rome K/G treedozer, unlike the bulldozer blade
which clears by uprooting, works on the shearing principle
in that the total horsepower of the tractor is applied to
the sharp cutting edge extending the length of the blade.
In addition to the cutting edge, a wedge-like projection,
the "stinger," extends forward from the left of the leading
edge of the blade. This allows larger trees to be split in
one or more passes before they are actually felled by the
cutting edge. In order to permit faster operation with less
operator fatigue, a flat sole is mounted on the heel of the
blade to float on the surface of the ground and conform to
21

topographic irregularities. Through the technique of
shearing the vegetation at ground level or below, its dis-
posal by burning or extraction is much faster because it is
soil free. There is less soil disturbance since the tilted
blade cuts the vegetation rather than uprooting it. |DA
Pam 525-6 1970 ] .
The "Rome Plow" has become the nucleus of the
recently organized Engineer Land Clearing Company whose
primary mission is, "... to destroy or clear extensive dense
vegetation in critical areas for the purpose of denying its
use by the enemy as bases of operation, supply bases, mar-
shalling areas, ambush sites, and cover and concealment."-^
This unit, part of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineer organiza-
tion, has thirty medium crawler tractors each equipped with
the Rome kit. It was spawned by the success of the "Rome
Plow" used initially in twos and threes by practically all
engineer elements in RVN. The land clearing role became so
large that in 1969 the Army organized the 62nd Engineer
Battalion to handle the clearing requirements in Military
Region III. Usually one of its three plow companies was
placed in support of a divisional clearing mission. The
company was found to be the primary unit for employment
since fragmenting it into smaller elements for prolonged
periods of time resulted in the loss of maintenance posture.
62nd Engineer Battalion Letter February 1971
3United States Army Combat Developments Command, Table
of Organization and Equipment Number 5-87T - Engineer Land
Clearing Company, p. 1, 7 February 1969.
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Photo # 3: Rome K/G blade and protection group on a
Caterpillar D7F tractor. Rome Plow Company Photograph
23

2. Clearing Estimates and Limitations
It is virtually impossible to establish exact rates
at which any piece of equipment can clear land. Such
factors as vegetation type, terrain, climate, enemy situa-
tion, and quality of assets available will directly influ-
ence this. Accurate estimates require a detailed clearing
reconnaissance to include several "tree counts" for tree
size, diameter of large trees, and secondary growth esti-
mates. The information from this reconnaissance can be
placed into one of several formulas developed by the Rome
Plow Company to determine time required per acre cleared.
Rome Industries Salesgram , 1 September 1971. In the event
that 'this procedure cannot be followed, the Department of
the Army has established planning estimates for clearing
operations using one land clearing tractor for various types
of cuts:
Table II-3: Land Clearing Estimates (Equipment-hours/unit)
VEGETATION UNIT AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING
LIGHT: Less than
12 inches in diameter Acre .4 .6
MEDIUM: 12 to 18
inches in diameter Acre .8 1.3
HEAVY: Greater than
18 inches in diameter Acre 1.3 2.1
Several factors which constrain tactical clearing
operations are soil traf ficability , support requirements,
4Department of the Army Pamphlet 525-6, Land Clearing
Lessons Learned, p. 60, 16 June 1970.
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and determination of the enemy to resist the land clearing
mission. Since the medium tractor with the Rome kit has a
gross weight of more than 20 tons, the ground must be rela-
tively solid to permit movement. This would restrict its
use in areas subject to heavy seasonal rainfalls and loca-
tions that are inundated on a regular basis, such as
mangrove swamps. Even if the terrain permits movement of
the tractors, there is always the possibility that it is
interlaced with streams, canals, or steep-sided gullies.
Supporting troops are necessary to install bridging across
these obstacles and assist in tractor recovery operations.
Aviation support is required for proper command and control
of large scale cutting operations. In many cases, the
engineer commander must be airborne to guide the lead
tractors since, in heavy vegetation, the operators' visi-
bility is negligible. Aerial reconnaissance of the cut is
also essential for sound planning and accurate assessment
of the clearing to be accomplished. During RVN clearing
operations, the land clearing companies of the 62d Engineer
Battalion were furnished observation helicopters on the
average of five hours per working day. 62d Engineer
Battalion Letter, February 1971.1
For immediate protection of the land clearing
company, the desired security force is one armored cavalry
troop or one mechanized infantry company. Foot infantry
would have difficulty in keeping up with the tractors and
would have no protection from falling trees. If the area
25

to be cleared is a particularly important enemy stronghold,
the implementation of a clearing effort will probably
necessitate the commencement of a major offensive operation.
The enemy recognizes the effect that the clearing will have
on his operations and can be expected to resist by any means
available to him.
Photo #4: Enemy 50 caliber machinegun damage to the Rome






Photo # 5: Land clearing with the Rome K/G blade on a D7
Caterpillar tractor. Rome Plow Company Photograph
27

C. "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING
Indigenous personnel can be hired to assist in many land
clearing operations or to conduct small-scale clearing
efforts on their own ("slash and burn" operations) . They
can be employed in clearing vegetation adjacent to lines of
communications (LOC) , around support bases, and removing/
burning debris from other operations. The objectives of
this technique are similar to the tactical land clearing
operations with the additional function of releasing U.S.
troops for more pressing combat roles.
1. Organization
Usually, the personnel for the operations are
recruited and hired by the U.S. force's Civil Affairs staff
working in conjunction with the host country's local and
national labor office. These officials determine the
salaries and working conditions. They attempt to get job
applicants with previous experience in clearing or lumber-
ing. The equipment, support, and supervision for the
clearers is furnished by the U.S. unit working in the AO.
This system was used by the Army during the Korean
War. It was designed to help the Republic of Korea's massive
unemployment problems and assist the allies in accomplishing
tasks requiring unskilled labor. The Koreans served as
ammunition bearers, porters, kitchen police, and woodcutters.
Its success was such that at the end of the war the Korean
Service Corps (KSC) was formed on a paramilitary basis.
28

To the present day, the KSC has provided labor augmentation
for the residual United Nations troops that have remained
in Korea.
2. Clearing Estimates and Limitations
Like tactical land clearing, production rates are
dependent upon many variables: morale, health, state of
experience, terrain, crew size, and supervision. Planners
must also consider the time required to transport the
personnel to and from the clearing sites since security
requirements would eliminate the possibility of remaining
in the area overnight. The planning rates that have been
established by DA are:
5Table II-4: Clearing By Hand
VEGETATION UNIT MAN-HOURS PER UNIT
LIGHT: Less than 12 Acre 125
inches in diameter.
MEDIUM: 12 to 18 inches Acre 350
in diameter.
HEAVY: Greater than 18 Acre 800
inches in diameter.
**
LIGHT: Same as above but 100 Linear 25
strip 10 meters wide.* Meters
MEDIUM: Same as above 100 Linear 70**
but strip 10 meters wide.* Meters
*Strip clearing.
**Approximately 100 man-hours/linear acre and 280 man-hours/
linear acre.
5 Ibid




The use of "slash and burn" techniques for vegetation
removal is usually limited to secure areas or where major
combat operations are already in progress. Time serves as
an additional constraint on the method since a great many
cutters are required to clear an area in a short period.
However, it is particularly useful in areas where the soil
trafficability will not support the heavy equipment required
for tactical land clearing.
D. FIREBOMBING
Firebombing is a method of reducing vegetation by burning
the foliage with incendiary munitions. The primary means to
accomplish this is by dropping drums of thickened fuel
(napalm) from helicopters or fixed wing aircraft. The
technique is especially applicable to area clearance in loca-
tions where there is a definite dry season during the year.
The objectives of firebombing coincide with those of herbi-
cide operations but the results differ in that the trees are
permanently destroyed and not subject to regrowth. The
tactic was first used in RVN in 1967 during Operation PINK
ROSE in which Air Force aircraft were employed to drop the
cannisters of napalm on the target areas. Its purpose was
to burn-off enemy infiltration routes in the northern
provinces and base areas in War Zone C and D, all of which




1. Organization and Equipment
Authority to burn portions of an AO is usually
delegated to the division commanders. The Army uses the
twin-engine CH-47 helicopter ("Chinook") to conduct fire-
bombing missions. Thickened fuel, consisting of gasoline
mixed with M-4 fuel thickener, is placed in salvaged 55-
gallon drums and sling-loaded beneath the CH-47. Fifteen
to twenty drums are carried in one lift, depending on the
aircraft's fuel load and weather conditions. When the
aircraft is over the target, the drums are released and fall
in a cluster into the impact area. The drops are supervised
by a command and control officer in a light observation
helicopter (LOH) , and if air assets are available, security
is provided by several helicopter gunships (AH-lG) . LTC
Rudrow
2. Coverage and Limitations
Evaluation of the coverage of a firebombing mission
is very difficult since proper burning is subject to many
conditions. Some of the factors that effect and limit the
coverage are:
(1) Dryness of the vegetation
(2) Wind and temperature
(3) Probability of a drum cluster detonation
upon contact with the ground
(4) Number of drums per lift.
31

These variables dictate the use of a probabilistic model to
estimate the coverage of any particular firebombing mission.
In addition to the factors mentioned above, fire-
bombing missions are limited by the utilization of the CH-47
in other roles. The "Chinook" has become the workhorse for
the Army's medium lift tasks. In RVN, it has been exten-
sively used for transportation of artillery pieces and
resupply of forward bases. Hence, there is a high demand
for the aircraft, and the commander must decide on which




The alternatives for this study will be analyzed with
respect to the two primary missions of herbicide operations:
1. Removal of foliage (defoliation) in order to deny
the enemy cover and concealment.
2. The destruction of crops in the enemy's territory in
order to curtail his ability to forage off the land. To
accomplish this, costs for each method must be isolated in
some uniform manner and in units to facilitate a cost-
effectiveness evaluation for several measures of effective-
ness (MOE) . The vectors resulting from this evaluation can
then be compared on an intra-system, inter-system and force-
mix basis.
The analysis of the alternatives will take the form of
the major subheadings below. Each of these sections
attempts to amplify the "how and why" of the methodology
used in Chapter IV through VII.
A. GENERAL ASSUMPTIONS
Implicit in the assumptions for each alternative is the
adherence to the system descriptions of Chapter II. Several
general assumptions are also applicable.
In order to simplify the analysis and the data collec-
tion, all alternatives are assumed to have commenced their
operations at the same point in time. It is also assumed
that all systems are in "steady state" and not subject to
33

the initial erratic fluctuations in costs that new systems
often demonstrate prior to the occurrence of the "learning
curve" phenomena. At the end of the systems' life, all are
given a zero residual value.
Finally, no adjustments are made to the costs for
inflation. While inflationary pressures have abated slight-
ly, it is doubtful that the price stability of the early
1960's will return in the near future. This could introduce
some bias when looking at yearly costs, total system cost
(TSC) , and investment replacement of primary mission equip-
ment (PME) over the planning horizon. Augusta and Snyder
197 o]
B. PARAMETERS
The planning horizon for the analyses will be ten years.
Like the explicitly stated parameters for each alternative,
this is a reasonable estimate but in no way reflects any
official policy. The reviewer should be cautioned that the
planning horizon and other inputs are optimistic estimates
and adverse conditions can change them significantly. Where
a great deal of uncertainty exists as to the parameter
values, upper (U) and lower (L) cost bounds will be speci-
fied for each alternative. Most of these bounds reflect the
judgement of men who were involved with these systems during




All costs will be determined in reference to one unit
equipment (UE) . A UE could be one specially equipped
aircraft, one crawler tractor with the Rome kit, or a crew
of indigenous cutters for "slash and burn" clearing. With
this in mind, life cycle costs will be identified through a
generalized input structure. Since no research and develop-
ment (RD) costs are encountered, only the following major




Replacement of Equipment due to















These inputs are used to obtain a system cost (SC) by
evaluating each cost category with respect to the major
subsystems of each alternative. The basic equation used in
the analysis is:
SC = a I I
J
ICjj + a I I OC iJ
where a_ is a constant to obtain costs in the desired units
(i.e., $/year, $/mission, or $/day) and ICjj is the j th
investment cost of the ith subsystem. Generally, costs will
be determined in units associated with basic operating times,
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Ground-based systems will be evaluated in terms of dollars
per day and aviation systems in dollars per mission.
Included in the operating cost input program will be
several opportunity costs. Although they will never be
reflected in tables of costs held by service comptrollers,
they are very real costs due to the scarcity of personnel
and equipment assets in combat. There is difficulty judging
what cost should be attached to a supervisory or security
force that could be gainfully employed in other combat opera-
tions. In order to tackle this problem in the study, the
cost assessed will be that operating cost incurred by the
force over the period that it was used.
D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Effectiveness Criteria
The measures of effectiveness (MOE) should be
closely related to the mission objectives. However, it is
very hard to quantify the results of any denial operation
because one soon gets into the realm of trying to determine
"why something did not happen." These types of objectives
force the writer away from "objective-oriented" MOE's and
toward the "performance-oriented" effectiveness criteria.
Two MOE's will be utilized in order that a balanced
presentation of each alternative may be achieved,
a. MOE # 1 - "Area"
The first MOE will be that of "area treated,
cleared or burned per normal operating period." These
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three terms show the different effects that each alternative
has on the terrain. However, they present an evaluation of
each system's effectiveness and give a specific indication
of their performance capability during a normal operating
period.
b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization
This MOE is designed to determine which alterna-
tives can complete a given mission subject to the exigencies
of combat. It attempts to take a reasonable mission of
denying the enemy cover and concealment in a given area and
requiring that this be completed prior to certain time
limits and within theater asset constraints. In program
format:
Minimize the cost of denying cover and concealment in
a 6,000 acre base area
Subject to: (1) Mission accomplishment in 30 days or less.
(2) Mission asset requirements within the
supply capability of the responsible
commander.
A vegetation removal mission was chosen since
these were the most common of the herbicide missions in RVN.
The figure of 6,000 acres was designated because this is
approximately 25 grid squares on a 1:25,000 or 1:50,000
topographical map and could easily be a suspected insurgent
base area. Although this is a large scale mission, it is
not unreasonable since there have been defoliation/clearing
operations in War Zone C and other parts of Military Region
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Ill in RVN that encompassed larger areas (during Operation
JUNCTION CITY) . The effects of reducing the mission size
are also examined in Chapter VIII, Section B.
Constraint # 2 of the program requires the determina-
tion of what will be the "supply capability of the responsi-
ble commander." To resolve this, the author will use his
judgement and past experience in RVN to determine what are
"reasonable" and "unreasonable" asset requirements to
accomplish a particular mission.
2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures
Using the cost measures of the analysis section and
the effectiveness criteria, cost-effectiveness measures can
be developed for each system in dollars per acre. These
measures can then be segregated into mission categories for
foliage removal and crop destruction with maximum and mini-
mum cost limits. These coupled with the cost minimization
vectors will help illuminate the differences in the systems,
their costs, and their effectiveness in support of counter-
insurgency operations.
E. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY
Sensitivity analysis will be used to test the parametric
uncertainties in each system. The testing will examine the
system costs as the parameters vary over a reasonable range
of values. Although the only relevant costs are dollar
costs, the sensitivity tables will show dollars and cents.
Certainly, the calculation of costs to the actual pennies
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is not relevant or meant to be a serious cost estimate.
However, this is done since they demonstrate the orders of
magnitude of change over the range of the parameter values.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF AERIAL DELIVERY OF HERBICIDES
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1. UC-123
a. Each aircraft has an expected life of ten years
after modification for herbicide operations. [Major Pyatt]
b. Each sortie has an expected duration of two
hours. Major Hidalgo!
c. Flights over a given target consist of between
two and seven herbicide aircraft.
d. Security for each flight consists of four USAF
A-1E "Skyraider" aircraft. Control for each flight consists
of one forward air controller (FAC) in a USAF OV-10 "Bronco."
(Downs and Scrivner 1970 I
e. Each UC-123K has a 90 per cent coverage effi-
ciency for its 1,000 gallon load. (See sensitivity analy-
sis, Sec. E)
2. UH-1
a. A variety of "Hueys" have been employed in RVN.
For this study, use of the UH-1H is assumed.
b. Each sortie has a duration of one-half hour.
I LTC Rudrew
J
c. A flight over a given target consists of one
helicopter.
d. The AGAVENCO sprayer will be the only helicopter-
mounted system considered. Although the capacity of the
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tank is 200 gallons, weight limitations under combat
conditions curtail the load. A 100 gallon per mission load
will be analyzed. [LTC Sanches 1 and f DA TC 3-16 1969
J
e. When available, armed helicopter security
consists of two AH-lG "Cobras." [LTC Rudrow]
f. The UH-1H has a 90 per cent coverage efficiency
for its 100 gallon load. It is employed under the same
operational and climatic conditions as the UC-123 missions.
(Also see sensitivity analysis, Sec. E)
B. PARAMETERS
1. Flying Hours
Since the UC-123K has a two-hour mission duration,
25 missions per month per aircraft (or 600 hours per year)
will be the study parameter. Data indicates that the sortie
rate varies considerably over a year's operation and that the
use of 25 sorties per month would not be unreasonable Major
Hidalgo
J
. A similar number of flying hours per year for the
UH-1H would dictate a sortie rate of 100 missions per month.
However, this is probably less than the normal rate since
the UH-1H has a programmed flying-hour limit of up to 960
hours per year in an active combat environment. DA Field
Manual (FM) 101-20 1970 . This implies that the effects
of the sortie generation rate for both aircraft should be





Bounds on certain portions of the herbicide costs
are set by the variation in security, control, and trans-
portation costs that can occur in normal operations. These
parameters set the "optimistic and pessimistic" bounds for
system cost. Since the UC-123 flights range from two to
seven aircraft, the security and control cost (for four
A-lE's and one OV-10) must be pro rated in accordance with
the number of herbicide aircraft per flight to obtain a cost
for one unit equipment (UE) . Costing the helicopter system
does not present this problem since the operations are
usually conducted with one UH-1 (assumption c) . Hence, the
security costs for a UH-1 mission can range from zero to the
cost of using two "Cobras" for one-half hour. The UH-1 has
an additional bound on the investment cost formed by the
mode of transporting (surface or air) the AGAVENCO system to
the combat theater.
C. COST ANALYSIS
1. Isolation of Relevant Costs
A detailed breakdown of these costs can be found in
Appendix A.
a. UC-123K
Research and Development: None.
Investment Costs for the aircraft subsystem:
(1) Initial procurement of the aircraft is a
sunk cost since the C-123B's were drawn from air assets that
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existed in the Air Force inventory. Hence, it will not be
considered.
(2) Jet engine modification: Conversion of the
C-123B to a turbo-jet model (C-123K) : $302, 732/aircraft.
J
Miss Lucky]
Operating Costs for the aircraft subsystem:
(1) Operating and maintenance (O&M) : $700,000/
aircraft. [captain Wallace
j
(2) Modernization cost: A two per cent per year
cost is incurred by each aircraft for modernization expendi-
tures. .02 x $870,000/aircraft = $17 , 400/aircraft/year
.
[Captain Wallace!
(3) Security costs: The operating cost for one
A-1E is $200/hour. Major Sims The munition expenditures
for one A-1E are $1250/mission. j LTC Cooper For a two-
hour mission with four A-lE's, the cost amounts to $6600/
mission.
(4) Control costs: The operating cost for the
OV-10 is $54/hour and $1000/aircraft for a full load of
munitions. jLTC Monoham
j
This amounts to a control cost
of $1108/mission.
(5) Combat attrition rates are negligible since
only two aircraft have been lost to enemy fire since 1962.
[
Downs and Scrivner 197 I
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Investment Cost for the aerosol subsystem :
(1) The dispenser mechanism consists of the
installation of the Hayes AA-45 system at a cost of $37,254/
aircraft. jMiss Lucky I
(2) Additional armor plating: $19, 354/aircraft.
I Miss Lucky I
Operating Costs for the aerosol subsystem:
(1) Maintenance of the dispenser system, training
the operators, and stocking spare parts are included in the
cost of operating the aircraft.
(2) Cost of herbicides: The USAF is responsible
for procurement of herbicides for all users. The cost of
the agent includes shipment and storage costs. Mr. Carter]
AGENT COST/GALLON COST/MISSION
WHITE $7.78 $7,780
ORANGE $7 .24 $7 , 240
BLUE $2.31 $2,310
b. UH-1H
Research and Development: None.
Investment Cost for UH-1H: This is a sunk cost
since the helicopter used for herbicide operations is diver-
ted from Army aviation assets on a "need" basis.
Operating Cost for UH-1H:
(1) O&M costs are rated at 15 per cent of the
aircraft procurement cost. Mr. Donaldson 1 Since the UH-1H
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costs $266,578 [da FM 101-20 1970
J
, the O&M cost is
approximately $40, 000/year.
(2) Crew salaries are not included in Army O&M
estimates. Normal combat crew on a UH-1 is two pilots and
two door gunners. These yearly opportunity costs amount to:
2 x $14,000/officer/year = $28, 000/year
2 x $10,000/enlisted man/year = $20,000/year 1 DA Fact
Sheet 1971 1 and j Major Howe
(3) Security costs range from zero (no security)
to $200/mission for two AH-lG "Cobras." (Appendix A)
Investment Costs for the aerosol subsystem:
(1) Procurement of AGAVENCO system: $7,850
[Mr. Drake
j
(2) Transportation cost for the AGAVENCO: $545
by ship and $1,937 by aircraft. Major Howe
(3) The expected life of the UH-1H equipped for
herbicide missions is ten years. Mr. Donaldson!
Operating Cost for the aerosol subsystem :
(1) The maintenance cost of the AGAVENCO system
is nine per cent of the procurement cost: $707/year. I Mr.
Drake
j











Using the relevant costs and the herbicide parameter,
a yearly system cost can be developed from the formula:
SC = a L L-, ICji +b L L 0Cii
i j i j
where a is the reciprocal of the expected life (and equal
to the planning horizon) and b is a dimensional constant
to obtain costs in dollars per year.
a. Identification of Costs for UC-123K
Investment Cost = 1/10 (Engine modification +
spray system + armor) = $35, 934/year.
Operating Cost = O&M cost + Security cost +
Control cost + Agent cost.
The security and control (S&C) costs for a UE on any
particular mission can be found in the following manner:
Security cost (U) : $6600/flight _ $33oo/aircraft
2 aircraft/flight
$6600/flight
Security cost (L) : •=,
\ r . TZ\ ZTZ = $943/aircraf
t
1 v 7 aircraft/flight
(A similar procedure determines the control cost.) Using
the parameter that a UC-123K flies 25 missions per month.
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the yearly mission rate would be 300 missions (msn) per
year. A typical calculation, this one for the upper bound
using Agent WHITE, is as follows:
Operating Cost = $700,000/yr + $17,400/yr + 300 msn/yr x
$3300/msn + 300 msn/yr x $554/msn + 300 msn/yr x $7780/msn =
$4,207,600/year.
Table IV-1: Yearly Costs for UC-123K
(Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year)




b. Identification of Costs for UH-1H
Investment Cost = 1/10 (AGAVENCO Cost +
Transportation Cost) = $979/year (U) or $840/year (L)
.
Operating Cost = O&M Cost + Security Cost +
Agent Cost.
The UH-1 will fly 100 missions per month. (Section B) An
upper bound cost using Agent WHITE: Operating Cost =
$98,707/yr + 1200 msn/yr x $200/msn + 1200 msn/yr x $778/msn
= $1,272, 307/year.
Table IV-2: Yearly Costs for UI-I-lH
(Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year)
AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
WHITE $1,033 $1,273
ORANGE $ .968 $1,208
BLUE $ .377 $ .617
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Table IV-2: Yearly Costs for UH-1H
(Costs in Millions of Dollars per Year)
AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
WHITE $1,033 $1,273
ORANGE $ .968 $1,208
BLUE $ .377 $ .617
c . Remarks
At this point a total system cost could be
readily identified. However, like the yearly cost, it is
extremely sensitive to the particular input parameters. The
parameter of "missions per year" accounts for a major
portion of the system cost solely by virtue of its multi-
plicative role in the cost formula. The reviewer must
consider this when evaluating the systems with respect to
the outlay of funds on a yearly basis for a UE. More
important than the magnitude of the costs involved is the
relative difference between the two systems.
3. Mission Costs
The cost of a herbicide mission gives the reviewer
a better insight into the dollars involved for a UE. This
cost is more suitable to relate to an effectiveness
criterion that is oriented toward performance.
Mission Investment Cost:
Summation of the Investment Costs




Summation of O&M Costs/Year
+ Summation of Security, Control,
Number of Msn/Year and Agent costs/Mission
Table IV-3: UC-123K Mission Costs
(Dollars per Mission)
AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
IC OC SC IC oc sc
WHITE $120 $11,272 $11,392 $120 $14,025 $14,145
ORANGE $120 $10,732 $10,852 $120 $13,485 $13,605
BLUE $120 $ 5,802 $ 5,922 $120 $ 8,555 $ 8,675
The costs are not categorized for the helicopter since the
UH-1H investment cost is negligible.
Table IV-4:. UH-1H Mission Costs
(Dollars per Mission)




It is evident after this analysis that the agent
cost comprises a large portion of the system cost for both
alternatives. It accounts for approximately 50 per cent of
the UC-123K costs and about 80 of the UH-1 mission cost.
The extent of this can be examined by looking at the two
systems participating in defoliation operations. If the
cost of the agent is varied from one dollar to ten dollars






better illustrated. This can also allow the reviewer the
opportunity to examine the cost expectation of a sudden
technicological breakthrough in the chemical industry
causing a decrease in prices or if current trends in upward
prices continue.
Table IV-5: Cost Variation Due to Agent Costs
(Dollars per Mission)
COST OF AGENT SYSTEM COST
($/Gal) UH-1 ($/Msn) UC-123











D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Effectiveness Criteria
a. MOE #1 - "Area"
This measure of effectiveness, "acres treated
per mission," presents the systems' overall or net effective-
ness during a normal operating period.
Gallons/Mission
Effectiveness Criterion (EC) = e x Gallons/Acre
where e is the coverage factor. For UC-123 operations,





183 383 4612 7365
283 483 5612 8365
383 583 6612 9365
483 683 7612 10365
583 783 8612 11365
683 883 9612 12365
783 983 10612 13365
883 1083 11612 14365
983 1183 12612 15365
1083 1283 13612 16365

EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA (Acres/Mission)
AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
UH-1H UC-123 UH-1H UC-123
WHITE 30 300 30 300
ORANGE 30 300 30 300
BLUE 60 600 30 300
b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization
This MOE takes the following mathematical
programming format:
Minimize the cost of defoliating 6000 acres
Subject to:
Mission completion 1 30 days
Assets required 1 Command's supply
capability
In addition to the assumptions of this chapter, several more
are necessary to restrict the analysis.
(1) Flights by UC-123K' s will be examined in
relation to a minimum of two and a maximum of seven aircraft
per flight.
(2) Agent ORANGE will be the defoliant.
(3) Spraying must be completed within five days.
The last restriction is necessary since herbi-
cides require approximately three to four weeks to act on
tropical vegetation. For herbicides to be effective, they
must remove a sufficient amount of foliage to deny the
enemy use of the terrain for base areas and daylight
movement and to permit improved aerial observation. The
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requirement is amplified by the following chart:
Defoliant Rate 1 Wk 2 Wk 1 Mo 3 Mo 6 Mo 1 Yr
ORANGE 3 gal/acre 19/8 7 3/32 89/7 3 7 9 66 54
(The figure to the left of the slash represents percentage
of leaves desicated; that to the right represents the
percentage of leaves defoliated. The single figure is
defoliation.
)
Therefore, it is imperative that the agent be







Table IV-6A: Aerial Delivery of Herbicides
(Dollars per Acre)
AGENT LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
UH-1H UC-123 UH-1H UC-123
WHITE $29 $38 $35 $47
ORANGE $27 $36 $34 $45
BLUE $ 5 $10 $17 $29
Breaking these costs into the two primary mission
categories (defoliation and crop destruction) , maximum and
House, W. B. and others, Assessment of the Ecological
Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides , p. 141,
Midwest Research Institute, 1967.
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minimum limits are formed. The mission categories facilitate
comparison with the other alternatives. This is readily-
done since ORANGE and WHITE are general purpose defoliants
and BLUE is exclusively used for crop destruction. In the
next table, the maximum and minimum limits on defoliation
missions are formed by using Agent WHITE'S upper bound and
ORANGE'S lower bound. The maximum and minimum cost vectors
for crop destruction can be taken directly from Table IV-6A.




MIN MAX MIN MAX
Defoliation $27 $35 $36 $47
Crop Destruction $ 5 $17 $10 $29
b. MOE #2
Defoliation of a 6,000 acre area would require
ten flights of two UC-123K's or three flights of seven
UC-123K aircraft (each aircraft covering 300 acres per
mission). The five-day dissemination period could easily
be accomplished even with the smallest flight. If a
squadron organization existed, the requirement would have
little or no effect.
Upper Bound:




$10,852/aircraft/msn x 7 aircraft x 3 missions = $227,892.
Using the UH-lH's effectiveness criterion of 30
acres per mission, 200 sorties would be required. This
implies that 100 helicopter flying hours would be needed in
a five-day period. This would be a tremendous drain on the
aviation assets of a division commander and would mean that
he would have to divert five to ten helicopters a day for
the better part of a week to perform the defoliation task.
Hence, a violation of the second constraint might be
realized.
Table IV-7 : Minimum Cost Program For Defoliation
(Costs in Dollars)




The program constraints make the UH-1 virtually
infeasible for a mission of this scale.
E. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY
The sensitivity analysis is presented to determine the
effect of variation of three of the parameterized inputs
for the herbicide alternative. The tests are performed on
the maximum and minimum limits for the cost-effectiveness
categories in Table IV-6B.
1. Sensitivity of Sortie Generation Rate
a. UC-123 (Table IV-8A & 8B)
54

A sensitivity analysis indicates that this
parameter is not as crucial to the system cost explanation
as one might expect. Examination of the costs indicates
that even at the lower number of sorties per month the
system cost does not experience any appreciable rise. As
flying hours increase past the 600 hour per year mark, the
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CHART IV-1: SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE (UC-123)








H 1 1 H>
360 480 600 720 840 960
Flying Hours per Year
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b. UH-1H (Table IV-9A & 9B)
Table 9A and 9B show that the costs per acre
for defoliation and crop destruction are virtually insensi-
tive to the sortie generation rate of the aircraft. The
cause for this is the dominance of the agent cost. For a
mission flown with Agent ORANGE (lower bound) , the cost less
the defoliant is $83 per mission. This condition persists
throughout this analysis.
2. Sensitivity of Security and Control Costs
a. UC-123K (Table IV-10)
In the analysis, S & C costs range from $1100
per mission to approximately $3850 per mission. The lower
spectrum of the scale shows the costs that might be incurred
in a low-intensity environment that would require little or
no security. The costs above $4000 per mission indicate the
incremental changes when high-performance aircraft are allo-
cated to security roles in lieu of propeller-driven "Sky-
raiders. "
b. UH-1H (Table IV-11A & 11B)
c. Both sets of tables (10 and 11) show the effect
that security has on determining bounds on cost estimates.
They also point out that the difference in Agent WHITE and
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CHART IV-2: SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE (UH-1)















SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UC-123K


























































SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS. ..HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1
SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COSTS
DEFOLIATION




































SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1







































































3. Sensitivity of Effectiveness Criterion (Table IV-12
and Table IV-13)
These tables demonstrate the effect on system cost
when commanders insist on conducting herbicide operations
when conditions such as temperature, wind, and weather are
less than favorable.
4. Remarks
Prior to completing the analysis, the effect of
variation of the agent cost in terms of dollars per acre can
be investigated. (Reference Table IV-5) These show the
dominance of the agent costs.
Cost Variation Due to Agent Costs
(Cost in Dollars per Acre)
COST OF AGENT UH-1 ($/ACRE) UC-123 ($/ACRE)











$ 6 $13 $15 $25
$ 9 $16 $19 $28
$13 $19 $22 $31
$16 $23 $25 $35
$19 $26 $29 $38
$23 $29 $32 $41
$26 $33 $35 $45
$29 $36 $39 $48
$33 $39 $42 $51




SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UC-123
SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE
DEFOLIATION
COVERAGE % EFFECTIVE SYSTEM COST
(ACRES/MSN) ($/ACRE)
MIN. MAX.
220. 66.0 49.33 64.30
230. 69.0 47.18 61.50
240. 72.0 45.22 58.94
250. 75.0 43.41 56.58
260. 78.0 41.74 54.40
270. 81.0 40.19 52.39
280. 84.0 38.76 50.52
290. 87.0 37.42 48.78
300. 90.0 36.17 47.15
310. 93.0 35.01 45.63
320. 96.0 33.91 44.20
330. 99.0 32.89 42.86
CROP DESTRUCTION
COVERAGE SYSTEM COST
(ACRES/MSN) % EFFECTIVE ($/ACRE)
MIN. MAX. MIN. MAX.
440. 220. 66.0 13.46 39.43
460. 230. 69.0 12.87 37.72
480. 240. 72.0 12.34 36.15
500. 250. 75.0 11.84 34.70
520. 260. 78.0 11.39 33.37
540. 270. 81.0 10.97 32.13
560. 280. 84.0 10.58 30.98
580. 290. 87.0 10.21 29.91
600. 300. 90.0 9.87 28.92
620. 310. 93.0 9.55 27.98
640. 320. 96.0 9.25 27.11
660. 330. 99.0 8.97 26.29
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S 20 -- CROP DESTRUCTION








SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - HERBICIDE DELIVERY BY UH-1
SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE
DEFOLIATION
COVERAGE SYSTEM COST
(ACRES/MSN) % EFFECTIVE ($/ACRE)
MIN. MAX.
22. 66.0 36.68 48.23
23. 69.0 35.09 46.13
24. 72.0 33.62 44.21
25. 75.0 32.28 42.44
26. 78.0 31.04 40.81
27. 81.0 • 29.89 39.30
28. 84.0 28.82 37.90
29. 87.0 27.83 36.59
30. 90.0 26.90 35.37
31. 93.0 26.03 34.23
32. 96.0 25.22 33.16
33. 99.0 24.45 32.15
CROP DESTRUCTION
COVERAGE SYSTEM COST
(ACRES/MSN) % EFFECTIVE ($/ACRE)
MIN. MAX. MIN. MAX.
44. 22. 66.0 7.14 23.37
46. 23. 69.0 6.83 22.35
48. 24. 72.0 6.54 21.42
50. 25. 75.0 6.28 20.56
52. 26. 78.0 6.04 19.77
54. 27. 81.0 5.81 19.04
56. 28. 84.0 5.61 18.36
58. 29. 87.0 5.41 17.7 3
60. 30. 90.0 5.23 17.14
62. 31. 93.0 5.06 16.58
64. 32. 96.0 4.91 16.06
66. 33. 99.0 4.76 15.58
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CHART IV-4: SENSITIVITY OF EFFECTIVENESS OF COVERAGE (UH-1)















V. TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1. The vehicle examined will be the D7E/D7F medium
crawler tractor (made by the Caterpillar Tractor Company)
equipped with the Rome K/G clearing blade and protection
kit.
2. The expected life of the tractor under combat
conditions is two years. [Major Bennett | The expected life
of the blade and protection kit is one year. 62d Engineer
Battalion J
3. A land clearing company has 25 of its 30 medium
tractors operational at any one time. ! Planning factor from
DA Pam 526-6 197o]
4. Security forces consist of one armored cavalry
troop or a comparable -size mechanized infantry unit.
I Major Bennett I The operation is controlled by the
commander who is airborne in a light observation helicopter
(LOH) .
5. Crops are considered under the category of light
vegetation.
6. The discount rate is ten per cent.
B. PARAMETERS
1. Utilization
The operating time for the Rome-equipped tractor
will be eight hours per day. Normally, these vehicles work
75

in the field for 45 days prior to returning to their base
areas for a 15 -day "stand down" and maintenance period.
[62d Engineer Battalion Letter, February 197 1J This implies
a 75 per cent work factor and 270 work days per year.
2. Cost Bounds
a. Investment Cost
The investment cost for a tractor is bounded by
the consideration of inherited assets. When the Rome
clearing blade was introduced in RVN, the tractors "in
country" were equipped with bulldozer blades. These blades
were simply converted by unit maintenance personnel. In
other situations, the kits and tractors were sent to RVN to
form land clearing units. Thus, the upper bound considers
procurement of the initial tractor while the lower bound
considers the initial tractor to be a sunk cost.
b. Operating Cost
The operating costs are bounded by the security,
control, and readiness postures of the clearing unit. The
desired security for a land clearing company is an armored
cavalry troop while a mechanized infantry company (-) is a
less desired but acceptable replacement. DA Pam 525-6
1970 I The security costs will be considered to range from
$130 per day to $80 per day for a UE. (Appendix B) The
control costs are directly proportional to the use of the
LOH that is attached to the land clearing company during
clearing operations. The attachment can be from several
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hours to all day. f62d Engineer Battalion 11 April
197
1]
The unit readiness rating determines the
equipment and personnel manning levels. High ratings
dictate the assignment of two operators per tractor. How-
ever, during periods of budgetary austerity or when the
manpower pool cannot support this requirement, this is
lowered to the assignment of one operator per tractor.
I USACDC TOE 5-58T 1969]
C. COST ANALYSIS
1. Isolation of Relevant Costs (Appendix B)
a. Investment Cost
(1) Investment cost for D7 Tractor. This
investment cost is bounded by the requirement to procure
the initial tractor. Additionally, the expected life of
the D7 dictates replacement across the ten year planning
horizon. Since replacement is necessary, the planner must
consider the present value of the dollars spent in order
for an equitable comparison to be made with the other




*-h—*—h--#* TY^ rf01 2 345 67 8 9 10 * ea s
The present value coefficients will be:
8 8
PV1 = > = 3.5404 and PV2 = / r = 2 5404
ito U + D 1 fe (1 + r)
1
for i an even integer and r = .10. Hirshleifer 1970j
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D7 procurement cost: $32,916 [DA Supply Bulletin (SB)
700-200 197 1]
$ 2,400 [DA DCS, Logistics (LOG)
Total = $35,316 1971] (Appendix B)
Upper bound on the investment cost: 3.54 x $35, 3 16=$ 12 5, 019
Lower bound on the investment cost: 2.54 x $35,316=$ 89,703
(2) Investment cost for the Rome k/g blade and
kit. The blade and kit have an expected life of one year in
combat which means purchase from time zero to the end of
year nine.
= v x -J—< (1+r) 1PV3 > —: r = 6.759 where r = . 10 and
i=0
i = 0,1,2, ,8,9.
Procurement cost: $ 7,623 [DA SB 700-200 1971
Transportation to RVN: $ 900 [da DCSLOG 197 lj
Total = $ 8,523 (Appendix B)
Investment cost: 6.759 x $8,523 = $57,607.
(3) Investment cost due to combat attrition.
The Rome-equipped tractors of the 62d Engineer Battalion
(Land Clearing) have experienced a 25 per cent attrition
rate when engaged in tactical clearing. Major Bennett]
This would mean the replacement of the tractors and kits on
a yearly basis. The present value will be:
9
PV4 = ) r = 5.759 where r = . 10 and(l+r) 1
i=l v
i = 1,2,..., 8, 9. The investment cost for a UE is:
5.759 x .25 x ($35,316 + $8,523) = $63,117.
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(4) The total investment amortorized over the




(1) Hourly costs. Unless otherwise noted, the
costs listed here come from the Caterpillar Performance
Handbook .
Fuel: (Light Vegetation) 5.5 gal/hr x $.15/gal = $.83Ar
(Medium Vegetation) 7.0 gal/hr x $.15/gal = $1.05/hr
(Heavy Vegetation) 9.0 gal/hr x $.15/gal = $1.35/hr
Lubricants and filters: $.33/hr.
Tractor repairs: Using the Caterpillar repair factor, the
repair cost would be $4.60 per hour. However, a review of
the data furnished by Major Bennett indicates that $7.00
per hour is a more realistic figure.
Rome blade and kit repairs: $1.80/hr. Major Bennett]
Total hourly costs:
Heavy vegetation Medium Vegetation Light Vegetation
$10.48 $10.18 $9.96
(2) Daily costs.
Operators' salaries: Security cost: Control cost:
$55 (U) $27 (L) $130 (U) $80 (L) $6 (U) $4 (L)
(Appendix B)
2. Daily Costs
IC = Yearly cost/365 days and OC = 8 hours/day x
Hourly cost + Summation of Daily Costs.
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Table V-l: Daily Costs
(Dollars per Day)
VEGETATION LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND
IC oc SC IC OC SC
Light $58 $191 $249 $67 $271 $338
Medium $58 $193 $251 $67 $273 $340
Heavy $58 $195 $253 $67 $275 $342
3. Yearly Costs
Investment cost: 365 days/year x Investment cost/day.
Operating cost: 270 days/year x Operating cost/day.


















D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Effectiveness Criteria
a. MOE # 1 - "Area"
This MOE considers the system's net effective-
ness during a normal day's operation. The criteria takes
into consideration the three classifications of vegetation
and the two principal types of cuts.
80

. . „ .. . Hours availableEffectiveness Criterion =
Clearing rate
Using the clearing rates from Table II-3, the effectiveness
criteria for a UE can be obtained.
Table V-3: Effectiveness Criteria for One Tractor
(Acres per Day)




b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization
Minimize the cost of clearing 6000 acres
Subject to:
Mission completion ^ 30 days
Assets required ^, Ability of commander to supply
In order to examine the performance of the land clearing
operation under constrained cost minimization, several
additional assumptions are necessary:
(1) Vegetation is either categorized as heavy or
medium.
(2) Area clearing is required.
(3) Cost per day is based on 30 tractors in the
unit although only 25 are operational.
(4) Land clearing company has a high readiness
rating and security is provided by a cavalry troop (i.e.,
upper bound cost figures for heavy and medium area clearing
will hold) . Area clearing rates for a land clearing company
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with 25 of its 30 medium tractors conducting sustained
operations are:
Heavy vegetation Medium vegetation
100 acres/day 250 acres/day
[da Pam 525-6 197
o]
2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures
a. MOE #1 v















$12 $17 $19 $25
$25 $34 $41 $55
$41 $56 $66 $90
The mission categories must take into considera-
tion the terrain sensitivity of this alternative. The
minimum cost for both land clearing and crop destruction
are those costs incurred during light area clearing while
the maximum costs for land clearing are those that occur
during heavy strip clearing (maximum costs for crop destruc-








Land Clearing $12 $90
Crop Destruction $12 $25
The Rome-equipped tractor is limited to areas where crops
grow on trafficable terrain. This eliminates many paddy-
grown crops from this type mission.
b. MOE # 2
As pointed out previously, a medium land clearing
company can clear 100 acres per day in heavy vegetation and
250 acres per day in medium vegetation. The time constraint
on a 6,000 acre mission would require two companies working
for 30 days in heavy vegetation and one company working for
24 days in medium vegetation. The cost per day for a
company are
:
Heavy vegetation - $10,260 Medium vegetation - $10,200.




1. Utilization (Table V-6 A,B, & C)
The tables show the variability in costs (dollars
per acre) that occur in accordance with the operational
83

hours per day of each vehicle. The tables indicate the
importance of a high utilization factor, consistent with the
operators' and support elements' ability to perform the
required daily maintenance on the tractors.
2. Security (Table V-7A, B, & C)
The fluctuation in security cost demonstrates the
effect on system cost when the commander varies his security
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CHART V-l: SENSITIVITY OF TRACTOR UTILIZATION
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TABLE V-7A: MAX. COST - LAND CLEARING
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COST STRIP CLEARING
Heavy Clearing

























TABLE V-7B: MAX. COST - CROP DESTRUCTION
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COST STRIP CLEARING
Light Clearing



























TABLE V-7C: MIN. COST - LAND CLEARING AND CROP DESTRUCTION
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
SENSITIVITY OF SECURITY COST AREA CLEARING
Light Clearing



























VI. ANALYSIS OF "SLASH AND BURN" CLEARING
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1. A crew consists of 45 men with one U.S. enlisted man
as supervisor. All crew members are considered workers
since no allowance is made for any internal chain of command
among the personnel. I Mr. Underwood J
2. Payment of the indigenous cutters is consistent with
those rates paid in Military Region IV in the fall of 1970.
3. This type of clearing takes place in secure areas or
where security is provided by units already engaged in major
land clearing operations.
4. The U. S. units provide transportation for the
workers to and from the clearing site. Tools for the cutters
are drawn from current inventories. Mr. Underwood!
5. Crops fall into the category of light vegetation.
While the first four statements can be categorized as
"assumptions," they all have basis in fact. Mr. Elton
Undersood of the Army's Engineer Strategic Studies Group
verified these on a trip to RVN in May and June of 1971.
The data he returned with contained detailed information on
a U.S. -sponsored operation in An Kuyen Province on the Cau
Mau Peninsula during the period September to December 1970.
However, their inclusion as assumptions is meant to preclude




1. The utilization parameter will be in units of "hours
per day." For this portion of the study, a utilization
factor of eight hours per day and 270 work days per year
will be used. This corresponds to the utilization rates of
Chapter V. However, both of these inputs are part of the
working conditions that are agreed upon by the U.S. Civil
Affairs office prior to hiring the civilian crews.
2. Cost Bounds
The bounds on each method of cutting and each type
of vegetation are set by the maintenance and transportation
costs. These costs can range from zero to some preset value.
The cost for maintenance of the workers' tools and equipment
will be set at five dollars per crew per day. The transpor-
tation cost will be ten dollars per crew per day (based on
the utilization of two trucks for approximately one hour per
day).
C. COST ANALYSIS
1. Isolation of Relevant Costs
The only costs incurred by this method of clearing
are operating costs. The only investment cost would be the
procurement of tools, but by assumption # 4, these are sunk
costs.
a. Salaries
Each man is paid 200 piasters per day and
furnished one meal at a cost of 37 piasters per day.
93

I Mr. Underwood! This amounts to approximately $.86 per man
or $38.80 per crew per day based on the 1970 exchange rate
of 275 piasters to one U. S. dollar.
b. Supervision
The opportunity cost for using one U. S. enlisted
man as a supervisor is $10,000 per year or $27 per day.
I Major Howe
c. Transportation
In some cases, the crews could walk from their
assembly points to the clearing sites. If this were not
feasible, two trucks would be needed for approximately an
hour each day to transport the crews. Cost: $10/crew/day
(U) or zero (L) . (Section B)
d. Maintenance
Cost: $5/crew/day (U) or zero (L) . (Section B)
2. Daily Costs
Daily cost = Crew salaries + Supervision + Transpor-
tation + Maintenance
Upper Bound: $81 per crew per day
Lower Bound: $66 per crew per day
3. Yearly Costs
Yearly cost = 270 days/year x Cost per day
Upper Bound: $21,870 per year
Lower Bound: $17,820 per year
94

D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Effectiveness Criteria
a. MOE # 1 - "Area"
This MOE presents the system's net effectiveness
during a normal day's operation. Since this alternative is
sensitive to the three classifications of vegetation and two
types of clearing (strip and area) , six criteria will be
determined.
Hours available x Crew size
Effectiveness Criterion (EC) = — : ——Clearing Rate
The clearing rates are obtained from Table II-4. For light
area clearing:
„_, _ 8 hr/day x 45 menEC = < * =2.88 acres/day
125 man-hours/acre





b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization
Minimize the cost of clearing 6,000 acres
Subject to:
Mission completion i 30 days











Several assumptions are necessary to complete the examination
of this MOE:
(1) The vegetation is either medium or heavy.
(2) Method of clearing will be "area" type.
2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures
a. MOE # 1
Cos t/crew/dayCost-Effectiveness Measure = —
KC
For area clearing in light vegetation (U)
:
$ 81/crew/day
2.88 acres/day = ? 28 Per acre '
Similar calculations yield the following table:
Table VI-2: "Slash and Burn" Clearing
(Dollars per Acre)
VEGETATION AREA CLEARING STRIP CLEARING
Lower Upper Lower Upper




If these costs are to be depicted by mission categories, the
vegetation classifications and the method of clearing must
be encompassed by the maximum and minimum limits. Although
this gives a large interval for the costs to be within, the
review must remember that vegetation removal by ground
personnel and equipment is extremely sensitive to the type
of terrain which the work is being conducted in.
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$23 $28 $18 $23
$64 $79 $51 $63
$147 $180 $147 $180





Land Clearing $18 $180
Crop Destruction $18 $ 28
b. MOE # 2
In order to analyze this program, one roust first
look at the constraints. In medium vegetation, a crew of 45
can only clear one acre per day. The size of the operation
dictates that at least 200 acres must be cleared per day in
order to meet the 30 day time constraint. This would mean
200 crews or 9,000 men would have to be hired. It is
doubtful that the host government could supply or the U. S.
units could secure that many workers. Hence, this method of
clearing is considered infeasible for a large scale land
clearing operation.
E. PARAMETER SENSITIVITY
Since indigenous cutters are paid by the day, it would
be important to examine the cost fluctuation over a range of
possible utilization factors. As might be expected by
noting the units of the clearing rates (man-hours per acre)
,
changing the utilization factor from the established eight
hours per day results in a large cost variation. This shows
the importance of negotiating a work agreement that insures
enough "time on the job." It also amplifies the costs
97

incurred if the cutters' pick-up point were far from the
clearing site, causing an excessive amount of transporta-
tion time to decrease the crew utilization, or if the
supervisor were unable to motivate his crew.
TABLE VI -4: VEGETATION REMOVAL
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SLASH AND BURN CLEARING
















SENSITIVITY OF CREW UTILIZATION STRIP CLEARING
(Light Clearing)



























































TABLE VI-5: CROP DESTRUCTION
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS SLASH AND BURN CLEARING



































VII. ANALYSIS OF FIREBOMB ING
A. ASSUMPTIONS
1. Firebombing is conducted with the C-model medium
helicopter (CH-47C - "Chinook").
2. Each sortie has an expected duration of one-half
hour. 1 LTC RudrowJ
3. A flight over a given target consists of one CH-47C.
LTC Rudrow
4. Salvaged slings and salvaged 55-gallon drums are
used in the drops. M-4 fuel thickener is mixed with gaso-
line to form a six per cent solution of thickened fuel.
I DA TC 3-336 1965 Twenty drums will be carried on one
mission (or more common terminology, one "drop").
[LTC RudrowJ
5. The number of missions over a target area is
dependent on the requirement to have a .90 probability of
success from one or more drops.
6. When available, security forces consist of two AH-lG
armed helicopters. However, unlike herbicide missions with
the UH-1, firebombing missions will not be flown unless one
AH-lG is present. One OH-6A or OH-58A light observation





Initially, the flying hours for the CH-47 that will
be used as basis for the analysis will be the same as the
other aerial systems. A mission duration of one-half hour
implies that the helicopter will fly 100 sorties per month
in order to reach the specified 600 flying hours per year.
However, like the UH-1 helicopter, this is below the CH-47 '
s
programmed limit of flying (720 hours per year) in an active
combat environment. DA FM 101-20 1970 J The effects of
this difference will be examined in a sensitivity analysis
of the sortie generation rate in Section E.
2. Cost Bounds
The bounds on the mission costs are obtained by the
variation of the security and control posture that often
results during normal employment. Control of a drop is
accomplished by a representative of the ground commander in
an LOH. However, if the Chinook pilots are familiar with
the mission and the AO, the presence of the LOH is unneces-
sary. Under normal operating conditions, security is
provided by two AH-lG helicopters. The lower cost bound
is reached when only one armed helicopter is used. The use
of one "Cobra," even under the most austere conditions, is






1. Isolation of Relevant Costs
The only costs incurred by this method of vegetation
removal are those that are categorized as operating costs.
The procurement of the CH-47 is treated as a sunk cost since
the helicopter is diverted from normal lift missions to
conduct firebombing operations.
a. & M cost is rated at 15 per cent of the
procurement cost of the helicopter. Mr. Donaldson1 The
procurement cost for the CH-47C is $1,536,424. [da SB
700-200 197lj O & M cost: $230,000 per year.
b. Crew salaries: Crew consists of two officers
and one enlisted man. DA FM 101-20 1970] Total cost:
$38,000 per year. [Major Howe]
c. Security forces: $200 per mission (U) -2 AH-lG's
$100 per mission (L) -1 AH-lG.
(Appendix A)
d. Control: $ 25 per mission (U)
(L)
(Appendix C)
e. Thickened fuel: $163 per mission. (Appendix C)
2. Mission Cost
SC = (O & M cost
4- Salaries)
+ Security cost +
Number of Missions/Year
Control cost + Agent cost
Cost per Mission
LOWER BOUND UPPER BOUND




The yearly cost is extremely sensitive to the input
parameters. This, coupled with the fact that the CH-47







D. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES
1. Effectiveness Criteria
a. MOE # 1 - "Area"
The effectiveness of any one mission is contin-
gent upon many variables. The condition of the vegetation,
weather, scattering effect of the incendiary fuel, and the
probability of detonation of the drum cluster require that
the evaluation of effectiveness be accomplished with a
probabalistic model. An appropriate model would be a two
or three dimensional fragmenting projectile model. However,
this would require the determination of a lethality function
and directional variances of the bursting radii of the
cluster just to obtain a conditional single drop probability
of burn (pB ) . Since this data was not available, a simpler
model was used. The probability statement is:
Prob
Fire burns 50 acres in one
or more drops (missions)
when n drops are made
Prob(pB ,n) r .90.
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This uses the data from assumption # 5 and has the implicit
assumption that 50 acres will be burned per n drops
(missions)
.
Prob(pB ,n) = 1 - (1 - pB )
n
where pB is the probability that 50 acres are burned on
any particular drop.
Inherent in this model are the assumptions that:
(1) pB is the same for all drops.
(2) There is statistical independence between drops
(or no information is gained from one mission to the other)
.
An evaluation of n for Prob(p_.,n) £ .90 yields:
PB n Prob(pB ,n)








For this portion of the analysis, pB = .4, which will
necessitate five drops or missions to insure a .9 proba-
bility of burning 50 acres on at least one of the five drops,
b. MOE # 2 - Constrained Cost Minimization




Mission completion <i 30 days
Assets required 1 Local command supply capability
Two CH-47 helicopters would be required to fly ten sorties
per day for 30 days in order to be 90 per cent sure that
this method would burn off 6,000 acres. Like aerial deli-
very of herbicides in the UH-1 constrained case, this
represents a significant drain on the area's aviation assets.
Few commanders could afford such a program due to the
important role the "Chinook" plays in combat support and
combat service support operations in an insurgency conflict.
For this reason, it is felt that the second constraint is
violated, and thus, the alternative is infeasible. The area
would have to be reduced significantly for firebombing to be
a viable alternative.
2. Cost-Effectiveness Measures
N x Mission CostSystem Cost = ; where N = the
50 acres/mission
number of missions (drops)
.
No differentiation is made between crop destruction and
foliage removal for this alternative. The reviewer should
not overlook the problems encountered in RVN when attempts
were made to burn large caches of dry rice. Therefore, live
rice and other paddy-type crops would be virtually imper-
vious to destruction by firebombing.
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1. Sensitivity of Sortie Generation Rate (Table VTI-2)
Table VTI-2 indicates that the number of missions
flown per month has relatively little effect on the cost of
burning an acre. This is due to the fact that only $223 per
mission are subject to fluctuations caused by a variable
sortie rate. (Mission cost vector: ($611, $486).) The
remainder of the costs are caused by security, control, and
fuel costs and these are based on a flat rate per mission.
2. Sensitivity of Probability of Burn on any Single
Drop (pB ) (Table VII-3)
This testing shows the effect of varying the single
drop probability of burn over a reasonable range of values.
In actual operations, pB would have a tendency to be at the
lower end of this spectrum rather than the higher.
3. Sensitivity of Security Costs (Table VII-4)
These parameter values range from zero to the cost




TABLE VI I -2
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - FIREBOMB ING WITH CH-47
SENSITIVITY OF SORTIE GENERATION RATE ($/ACRE)
SORTIES HOURS SYSTEM COST SYSTEM COST




80. 480. 54.22 66.72
82. 490. 53.65 66.15
83. 500. 53.10 65.60
85. 510. 52.57 65.07
87. 520. 52.07 64.57
88. 530. 51.58 64.08
90. 540. 51.11 63.61
92. 550. 50.66 63.16
93. 560. 50.23 62.73
95. 570. 49.81 62.31
97. 580. 49.40 61.90
98. 590. 49.01 61.51
100. 600. 48.63 61.13
102. 610. 48.27 60.77
103. 620. 47.91 60.41
105. 630. 47.57 60.07
107. 640. 47.24 59.74
108. 650. 46.92 59.42
110. 660. 46.60 59.10
112. 670. 46.30 58.80
113. 680. 46.01 58.51
115. 690. 45.72 58.22
117. 700. 45.44 57.94
118. 710. 45.17 57.67




SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - FIREBOMBING WITH CH-47
SENSITIVITY OF PROBABILITY OF BURN ON ONE DROP
($/Acre)
# OF DROPS PB SYSTEM COST SYSTEM C<
MIN. MAX.
10. 0.20 97.27 122.27
8. 0.25 77.81 97.81
7. 0.30 68.09 85.59
6. 0.35 58.36 73.36
5. 0.40 48.63 61.13
4. 0.45 38.91 48.91
4. 0.50 38.91 48.91
3. 0.55 29.18 36.68
3. 0.60 29.18 36.68
' 3. 0.65 29.18 36.68
2. 0.70 19.45 24.45
2. 0.75 19.45 24.45
2. 0.80 19.45 24.45
2. 0.85 19.45 24.45
1. 0.90 9.73 12.23
TABLE VI I -4
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS - FIREBOMBING WITH CH-47


































VIII. INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSIONS
The need for defoliation and crop destruction is a
direct result of the tropical growth, climate, and pecu-
liarities of insurgency warfare. It would be difficult to
imagine the necessity of these measures in a conventional
war in a barren country like the Republic of Korea or in
many areas of Western Europe. Conventional war raises the
additional security problem of antiair protection and the
costs incurred to insure local air superiority. These and
other problems of the "linear war" have not been considered
here. Hence, the conclusions drawn from this study are
applicable only to those parts of the world affected by
certain climates, vegetation, and the pressing needs of
combating an enemy insurgent.
A. RESULTS OF THE ANALYSIS
1. MOE # 1
The first measure of effectiveness attempted to
focus on each system's performance capability. A complete
display of the results allows a better comparison of the
alternatives.
























HERBICIDES TACTICAL LAND "SLASH AND
UC-123 UH-1H CLEARING BURN" FIREBOMB ING
MAX. $29 $17 $25* $28 $61*
MIN. $10 $ 5 $12* $18
*$49
*.,
.Not appropriate where rice is the staple of the diet. (See
Table V-5)
Tactical land clearing and "slash and burn" clearing
show considerable variability in their maximum and minimum
cost limits. This is due to the terrain sensitive nature
of both systems. This, coupled with the different clearing
results (one improves vertical surveillance while the other
improves both vertical and horizontal surveillance) , makes
comparison with aerial-supported methods difficult. If
comparisons are made within aerial categories and within
ground categories for each mission type, dominance can be
used to eliminate some vectors, since the maximum and
minimum limits for these two groups of systems are caused
by the same factors.
FOLIAGE REMOVAL




When tactical land clearing and firebombing are
eliminated as alternatives for crop destruction, herbi-
cide delivery by UH-1 dominates all other vectors.
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2. MOE # 2
This measure of effectiveness attempted to amplify which
system (s) could meet a rigorous set of hypothetical combat
conditions. The program format was:
Minimize the cost of defoliating/clearing
6,000 acres
Subject to:
(1) Mission accomplishment in 30 days
(2) A reasonable amount of assets to
complete the task.
The major additional assumptions stated:
(1) Spraying (using Agent ORANGE) must be
accomplished within five days.
(2) The vegetation is either medium or heavy and
area clearing is required.
(3) Ground systems are considered to be in a
high state of readiness.
Table VIII-2: Cost Minimization Vectors for Foliage Removal
(6000 acres) with Time and Resource Constraints
(Costs in Dollars)
Herbicides UC-123K Tactical Land Clearing
(U) $272,100 $615,600
(L) $227,900 $244,800
**Infeasible alternatives are not shown.
The preceding table shows that only two alternatives
can meet a stringent set of combat conditions.
Ill

More important than the actual dollar costs is the
relative cost difference between the two systems. By
looking at this change in the cost minimization vectors, it
is possible to examine the incremental costs incurred to
vgain another dimension in surveillance capability. A
defoliation mission usually improves only vertical surveil-
lance. Although most of the leaves are off the vegetation,
the trees and undergrowth remain to restrict visual and
electronic surveillance from the ground. A tactical land
clearing operation removes all vegetation and thus produces
a horizontal capability as well as the vertical. It can
also be assumed that an area which has been subjected to
land clearing restricts enemy movement and channelizes his
movement far more than the same defoliated terrain.
B. INSIGHTS
In order to check the information of Table VIII-2 is
not biased by the scale of the operation, the mission size
can be restricted. By reducing the area by 50 per cent,
another set of cost minimization vectors can be obtained.
The assumptions of MOE # 2 are maintained with the exception
of having the UC-123 flights range from two to five aircraft.
Table VIII-3: Cost Minimization Vectors for Vegetation




(U) $100,700 $136,050 $307,800
(L) $ 80,700 $112,930 $112,400
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(Firebonibing would be feasible only if the area were less
than 1,000 acres.)
The relaxation of mission requirements indicates that
the UH-1 defoliation system is minimum cost system and for
this program dominates the other alternatives. However,
the figures do not show the faster mission accomplishment
rate of the UC-123 or the complete clearance capability of
the D7 tractor equipped with the Rome K/g clearing blade.
In order to gain more insight into the problem of
distinguishing between the systems, a "common mission"
vector can be obtained for each alternative. This vector
attempts to show the cost per acre for foliage removal under
conditions that are most likely to occur in a counter-
insurgency situation. It differs from the results of
Table VIII-1, which were oriented toward optimistic and
pessimistic estimates, in that it can be considered to be
the "best estimate." The conditions making up the "common
mission" are:
1. Defoliation/foliage removal operation (far more
common than crop destruction)
.
2. The vegetation is classified as medium or heavy
since thicker terrain is more valuable to the enemy for use
as sanctuaries, staging areas, hospitals, and base camps.
3. Clearing is limited to area type since strip
clearance is restricted to vegetation removal (anti-ambush
measures) along lines of communication.
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4. Defoliation systems use Agent ORANGE since it is
faster acting than WHITE but not as persistent.
5. Land clearing units have two operators per tractor
and the optimum security and control available.
Reference: Table IV-6A, Table V-4, Table VI-2, and
Table VII-1.
Table VIII-4: Common Mission Vectors (Dollars/Acre)
TACTICAL LAND "SLASH AND
HERBICIDES CLEARING BURN" FIREBOMBING
UH-1 UC-123
(u) $34 $45 $56 $180 $61
(L) $27 $36 $34 $ 79 $49
Again, herbicide delivery by UH-1 helicopter dominates
all other alternatives. These results serve to confirm the
findings shown in Tables VIII-1 through VIII-3.
C. CONCLUSIONS
The cost-effectiveness measures obtained in this study
through the evaluation of the two measures of effectiveness
indicate that a force mix of herbicide aircraft and land
clearing tractors would most likely provide a cost-
effective solution to the foliage removal/crop destruction
missions faced during counterinsurgency operations in an
RVN-type environment, especially when one takes into
account that horizontal and vertical vision is desirable.
However, this is not meant to exclude the employment of
firebomb ing or "slash and burn" clearing when the other
systems are not available to do the job.
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The ratio of the force-mix must be determined through
further examination of the problem. The decision to use
the UH-1, UC-123, or both as herbicide delivery systems
would depend on the intensity of the conflict, the commit-
ment of U.S. assets, and the desired flexibility of the
over-all force structure. Certainly the helicopter provides
more flexibility since it can be used for many other combat
support tasks. The UC-123 accomplishes its mission at a
much faster rate but is entirely committed to herbicide
operations since its configuration does not lend itself to
easy modification. Likewise, the amount of tractors and
their desired organization (sections, companies, battalions)
would be a function of the increased costs that the deci-
sion maker might be willing to accept to gain the benefit
of a two dimensional surveillance capability.
If the results of this study are to be useful in the
allocation of funds to foliage removal/crop destruction
missions, the decision maker must develop a detailed
situation estimate and employment model. This would include
a threat analysis of enemy forces and capabilities, an esti-
mate of friendly forces and objectives, and a contingency
analysis of possible commitment areas. If this were
accomplished and if an RVN-type environment were encountered
in the scenario, then the results of this study may be
applicable in determining a proper mix of systems to effec-






1. Yearly operating cost for a squadron in Pacific Air



















TOTAL = $8.4 million
This figure is for 12 aircraft. Thus the operating cost for




a. Installation of the Hayes AA-45 system. Total








b. Engine modification. Total of 183 aircraft.
$36.1 million
$11.2 million













Security costs for UH-1 herbicide missions. Direct
flying hour costs for AH-lG: $64 per hour [DA FM 101-20
1970J or $32 per mission. If approximately $70 were
allowed for munitions and salaries of pilots, the cost of




DETAILED COSTS FOR TACTICAL LAND CLEARING
A. Cost of lubricants and filters. The Caterpillar
Performance Handbook (Sec. 21, p. 5) gives a quick estimate
of $.26 per based on oil at $1 per U.S. gallon, grease at
$.20 per pound, EP oil at $1.10 per U.S. gallon, and filters
at U.S. Consumer's List Prices. Under heavy operating
conditions, these costs increase by 25 per cent.
B. Typical repair costs over a two-year period for medium
tractor and Rome kit in RVN: Major Bennett]
Number Equipment Unit Cost Total Cost
5 Eng ine $6,129 $30,645
2 Transmissions $4,498 $ 8,996
1 Winch $4,750 $ 4,750
5.5 Cabs $1,600 $ 8,800
18 Cutting Blades $ 278 $ 5,004
2.5 Blades $1,887 $ 4,718
1.2 Radiators $1,200 $ 1,440
2 Track assembly $1,249 $ 2,498
$66,850
C. Security costs are based on the approximate field
strengths of an armored cavalry troop and a mechanized
infantry rifle company (-) . Usually, the troop will field
approximately 130 to 140 men while the infantry company
would have between 100 and 120 men. The cavalry troop
would have 20 or more tracked vehicles and the infantry
unit would have 10 to 15.
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D. Costs for a light observation helicopter are based on
direct flying hour costs of $30 per hour. DA FM 101-20
1970]
E. Transportation Cost to RVN:
Shipping, Surface General Cargo ($/Ton)
Line Haul within U.S. $40
Port Handling, West Coast $21
Ocean Shipping $72





D7 Tractor: 16 tons x $150/ton = $2400
Rome kit and blade: 6 tons x $150/ton = $ 900




DETAILED COSTS FOR FIREBOMBING
A. Control costs are based on direct hour flying costs of
the LOH which are $30 per hour. pDA FM 101-20 1970] This
coupled with the pilot's salary and the ground commander '
s
representative yields a control cost of $25 per mission.
B. Thickened Fuel:
Pounds of M4 Thickener Needed for Various Blends of
Thickened Fuel
Gallons of Gasoline 4% 6% 8%
40 5 ik 10
50 eh 10 1332
[da TC 3-366 1965
J
Ten pounds of M4 thickener are used with each drum (55
gallon) of gasoline. M4 thickener costs $1.30 per 20 pound
can. [da SB 700-200 197 l] Using a cost of $.15 per gallon
of gasoline, a drum of thickened fuel costs $8.15.
$8.15/drum x 20 drums/mission = $163 per mission
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APPENDIX D: DATA SOURCES
The personnel listed in this appendix contributed in the
assembly of data for the study. The contributions and the
office/address (as of June 1971) are listed as documentation.
1. Aerial delivery of herbicides.
Mr. Carlton W. Carter: USAF Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS)
,
Systems and Logistics (S & L) , Washington, D. C. Costs of
herbicides to include transportation and storage.
a. UC-123K
(1) Miss Joyce E. Lucky: USAF ODCS, S & L,
Washington, D. C. UC-123 modification costs for engine
modifications, spray system, and armor plating.
(2) Captain James A. Wallace, USAF: Office of the
Comptroller of the Air Force, Washington, D. C. Procurement
and operating costs for the UC-123K.
(3) Major Robert Pyatt, USAF: ODCS, Plans and
Operations (Special Operations Division) , Washington, D. C.
General information about herbicide operations.
(4) Major Peter D. Hidalgo, USA: Office of the
Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (OACSFOR)
,
Washington, D. C. Verification of sortie duration and
sortie generation rates.
(5) LTC Kenneth M. Cooper, USAF: ODCS, S & L,
Washington, D. C. Operating cost for A-1E.
121

(6) LTC Arthur L- Monaham, USAF: ODCS, S & L,
Washington, D. C. Munition costs for FAC's.
(7) Major John D. Sims, USAF: ODCS, Programs and
Resources, Washington, D. C. Hourly operating costs for
the OV-10 and A-1E.
b. UH-1:
(1) LTC Manuel L. Sanches and LTC Robert G. Rudrow,
USA: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C. Aerosol system and capa-
city, attrition rates, security configurations, mission
duration, and system coverage.
(2) Mr. F. X. Donaldson: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C.
Maintenance factors and expected life of UH-1.
(3) Mr. Drake: Operations Manager, Agricultural
Aviation Engineering Company, 1333 Patrick Lane, Las Vegas,
Nevada, 89109. AGAVENCO System: Cost, size, maintenance
factor, and capacity.
(4) Major Robert Howe, USA: Engineer Strategic
Studies Group, Washington, D. C. Personnel salaries costs
and transportation costs for the AGAVENCO.
2. Tactical Land Clearing.
a. Major Richard Bennett, USA: Engineer Strategic
Studies Group (ESSG) , Washington, D. C. D7 tractor and Rome
kit repair costs and rates.
b. Mr. Jim Guthrie: Supervisor of Defense Services
Section, Caterpillar Tractor Company, Peoria, Illinois.
General information about the Caterpillar tractor.
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c. Mr. J. T. Soules: Vice President of International
Department, Rome Plow Company, Cedartown, Georgia. General
information about the Rome clearing blade and kit.
3. "Slash and burn" Clearing .
Mr. Elton Underwood: ESSG, Washington, D. C. Payment
rates for indigenous clearing crews and verification of
clearing rates.
4. Firebombing.
LTC Robert G. Rudrow, USA: OACSFOR, Washington, D. C.




Some sources listed in this bibliography are classified.
However, the information used in this study came from
unclassified sections of these documents.
1. American Embassy, Report on the Herbicide Policy Review
(U) , CONFIDENTIAL, Saigon, August 1968.
2. Augusta, Joseph H. and Snyder, Christopher L. , Defense
Planning In A High Inflation Economy, paper presented
at 26th Military Operations Research Symposium,
Monterey, California 17-18 November 1970.
3. Boffey, Philip M. , "Herbicides in Vietnam: AAAS Study
Finds Widespread Devastation," Science , v. 171,
p. 43-47, 8 January 1971.
4. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Peoria, Illinois, The
Caterpillar Performance Handbook , ed. 1, section 21,
December 1970.
5. Cook, Robert E. , Haseltine, William, and Galston, A. W.
,
"What Have We Done to Vietnam?" The New Republic,
p. 18-21, 10 January 1971.
"
6. "Defoliants-A Closed Case?" Commonweal ) p. 363-364,
15 January 1971.
7. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 172-3,
USAF Planning Factors (U) , CONFIDENTIAL, Washington,
D. C. , 31 March 1971.
8. Department of the Army, 18th Engineer Brigade, APO San
Francisco 96307, Demonstration and Testing in Vietnam,
July-August 1966.
9. , DA PAM 525-6, Lessons Learned - Land
Clearing , p. 23-79, Washington, D. C. , June 1970.
10.
, DCS Logistics, Transportation Analysis
Division, Budget Cost Factors for Cargo Movements,
p. 1-3, Washington, D. C. , 15 July 1971.
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11. , Fact Sheet - Personnel Investment Costs ,
Washington, D. C. , 12 October 1971.
12. , FM 101-20, United States Army Aviation
Planning Manual (U) , CONFIDENTIAL, p. 1-10, p. 4-2 -
4-3, Washington, D. C. , August 1970.
13. , SB 700-200, Army Adopted/Other Selected
Items and List of Reportable Items, p. 2-355 - 2-358.
Washington, D. C. , December 1970.
14. , TC 3-16, Employment of Riot Control Agents,
Flame, Smoke, Antiplant Agents, and Personnel
Detectors in Counterguerrilla Operations , p. 62 - 81,
Washington, D. C. , April 1969.
15. , TC 3-366, Flame Fuels , p. 3 - 5, p. 8 - 13,
Washington, D. C. , July 1965.
16. Directorate, Tactical Evaluation, Project CHECO -
Southeast Asia Report July 1961 - June 1967 (U)
,
SECRET, Headquarters Pacific Air Force, 11 October
1967.
17. Downs, E. D. and Scrivner, J. H. , Defoliation Operations
in Southeast Asia (U) , SECRET, Maxwell AFB, Alabama,
1970.
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p. 63-118, American Elsevier Publishing Co., 1971.
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1968.
20. Goodell, Hon. Charles E. (New York), U.S., Congress,
Senate, Congressional Record, 91st Cong., 2d sess.,
S -157 4 -S-1580.
~~~
~~
21. Headquarters, 62d Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco




Letter, Subject: "Narrative to Accompany
Slide Briefing, 11 April 1971.
23. Headquarters, 169th Engineer Battalion, APO San Francisco,
Letter, Subject: "Land Clearing Test Program
Completed, 16 August 1971.
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24. Hersh, Seymour M. , Chemical and Biological Warfare -
America's Hidden Arsenal
, p. 144-167, Bobbs-Merrill
Company, 1968.
25. Heymont, I. and others, A Guide for Reviewers of Studies
Containing Cost Effectiveness Analysis, Research
Analysis Corporation, July 1965.
26. Hirshleifer, J., Investment, Interest, and Capital , p.
48-49, Prentice-Hall, 1970.
27. House, W. B. and others, Assessment of Ecological
Effects of Extensive or Repeated Use of Herbicides,
p. 1-72 and p. 108-150, Midwest Research Institute,
30 November 1967.
28. Kastenmeier, Hon. Robert W. (Wisconsin), U.S., Congress,
House, "Ecological Destruction in Vietnam,"
Congressional Record - Extension of Remarks, 92d Cong.,
1st sess., E-2290 - E-2293.
29. Lewallen, John, Ecology of Devastation: Indochina,
p. 58-94, Penguin Books, 1971.
30. McCarthy, Richard D. , The Ultimate Folly , p. 75-98,
Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.
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31. McConnell, Arthur F. (LTC, USAF) , "Mission: Ranch Hand,"
Air University Review
, p. 89-94, v. 21, n. 2, January-
February 1970.
32. Nelson, Hon. Gaylord (Wisconsin), U.S., Congress, Senate,
"Environmental Warfare," Congressional Record, 91st
Cong., 2d sess., S-14217-S-14230.
33. Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Systems
Analysis) , Southeast Asia Analysis Report - March/April
1971 (U) , SECRET, p. 35-36 and p. 41-43, Washington,
D. C. , 14 May 1971.
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35.
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Land Clearing in Vietnam, p. 108, 9 February 1966.
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Clearing Blade, November 1971.
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